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CTHFM: Kubernetes
  • Welcome
  • Kubernetes Fundamentals
    • Kubernetes Components
      • Kubernetes Master Node
      • Worker Nodes
      • Pods
      • Service
      • ConfigMaps and Secrets
      • Namespaces
      • Deployments
      • ReplicaSets
      • Jobs and CronJobs
      • Horizontal Pod Autoscaler (HPA)
      • Kubernetes Ports and Protocols
    • Kubectl
      • Installation and Setup
      • Basic Kubectl
      • Working With Pods
      • Deployments and ReplicaSets
      • Services and Networking
      • ConfigMaps and Secrets
      • YAML Manifest Management
      • Debugging and Troubleshooting
      • Kubectl Scripting: Security
      • Customizing Kubectl
      • Security Best Practices
      • Common Issues
      • Reading YAML Files
    • MiniKube
      • Intro
      • Prerequisites
      • Installation MiniKube
      • Starting MiniKube
      • Deploy a Sample Application
      • Managing Kubernetes Resources
      • Configuring MiniKube
      • Persistent Storage in Minikube
      • Using Minikube for Local Development
      • Common Pitfalls
      • Best Practices
  • Kubernetes Logging
    • Kubernetes Logging Overview
    • Audit Logs
    • Node Logs
    • Pod Logs
    • Application Logs
    • Importance of Logging
    • Types of Logs
    • Collecting and Aggregating Logs
    • Monitoring and Alerting
    • Log Parsing and Enrichment
    • Security Considerations in Logging
    • Best Practices
    • Kubernetes Logging Architecture
  • Threat Hunting
    • Threat Hunting Introduction
    • What Makes Kubernetes Threat Hunting Unique
    • Threat Hunting Process
      • Hypothesis Generation
      • Investigation
      • Identification
      • Resolution & Follow Up
    • Pyramid of Pain
    • Threat Frameworks
      • MITRE Containers Matrix
        • MITRE Att&ck Concepts
        • MITRE Att&ck Data Sources
        • MITRE ATT&CK Mitigations
        • MITRE Att&ck Containers Matrix
      • Microsoft Threat for Kubernetes
    • Kubernetes Behavioral Analysis and Anomaly Detection
    • Threat Hunting Ideas
    • Threat Hunting Labs
  • Security Tools
    • Falco
      • Falco Overview
      • Falco's Architecture
      • Runtime Security Explained
      • Installation and Setup
      • Falco Rules
      • Tuning Falco Rules
      • Integrating Falco with Kubernetes
      • Detecting Common Threats with Falco
      • Integrating Falco with Other Security Tools
      • Automating Incident Response with Falco
      • Managing Falco Performance and Scalability
      • Updating and Maintaining Falco
      • Real-World Case Studies and Lessons Learned
      • Labs
        • Deploying Falco on a Kubernetes Cluster
        • Writing and Testing Custom Falco Rules
        • Integrating Falco with a SIEM System
        • Automating Responses to Falco Alerts
    • Open Policy Agent (OPA)
      • Introduction to Open Policy Agent (OPA)
      • Getting Started with OPA
      • Rego
      • Advanced Rego Concepts
      • Integrating OPA with Kubernetes
      • OPA Gatekeeper
      • Policy Enforcement in Microservices
      • OPA API Gateways
      • Introduction to CI/CD Pipelines and Policy Enforcement
      • External Data in OPA
      • Introduction to Decision Logging
      • OPA Performance Monitoring
      • OPA Implementation Best Practices
      • OPA Case Studies
      • OPA Ecosystem
    • Kube-Bench
    • Kube-Hunter
    • Trivy
    • Security Best Practices and Documentation
      • RBAC Good Practices
      • Official CVE Feed
      • Kubernetes Security Checklist
      • Securing a Cluster
      • OWASP
  • Open Source Tools
    • Cloud Native Computing Foundation (CNCF)
      • Security Projects
  • Infrastructure as Code
    • Kubernetes and Terraform
      • Key Focus Areas for Threat Hunters
      • Infastructure As Code: Kubernetes
      • Infrastructure as Code (IaC) Basics
      • Infastructure As Code Essential Commands
      • Terraform for Container Orchestration
      • Network and Load Balancing
      • Secrets Management
      • State Management
      • CI/CD
      • Security Considerations
      • Monitoring and Logging
      • Scaling and High Availability
      • Backup and Disaster Recovery
    • Helm
      • What is Helm?
      • Helm Architecture
      • Write Helm Charts
      • Using Helm Charts
      • Customizing Helm Charts
      • Customizing Helm Charts
      • Building Your Own Helm Chart
      • Advanced Helm Chart Customization
      • Helm Repositories
      • Helm Best Practices
      • Helmfile and Continuous Integration
      • Managing Secrets with Helm and Helm Secrets
      • Troubleshooting and Debugging Helm
      • Production Deployments
      • Helm Case Studies
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On this page
  • Overview
  • 1. Hash Values
  • 2. IP Addresses
  • 3. Domain Names
  • 4. Network/Host Artifacts
  • 5. Tools
  • 6. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs)
  • 7. Adversary Intent/Goals
  1. Threat Hunting

Pyramid of Pain

PreviousResolution & Follow UpNextThreat Frameworks

Last updated 9 months ago

Overview

The Pyramid of Pain is a framework designed to help cybersecurity professionals understand the effectiveness of different types of indicators in detecting and responding to cyber threats. Developed by David Bianco, the pyramid categorizes indicators based on how difficult they are for adversaries to change, and thus, how much "pain" they inflict on attackers when these indicators are effectively utilized by defenders. Here’s a breakdown of each level of the Pyramid of Pain:

1. Hash Values

At the base of the pyramid are hash values, which are unique identifiers generated from the contents of a file. Hash values are easy for defenders to use in identifying known malicious files. However, they are also easy for attackers to alter by making minor changes to their malware, thereby generating a new hash. This makes hash values the least painful for adversaries to overcome.

2. IP Addresses

The next level up includes IP addresses. While IP addresses can be useful in identifying the source or destination of network traffic associated with malicious activity, attackers can change these relatively easily. They might use proxy servers, VPNs, or compromised systems to alter their apparent IP address.

3. Domain Names

Domain names, used for identifying and locating computers on networks, are slightly more challenging for adversaries to change frequently. However, techniques like fast flux (rapidly changing DNS records) and domain generation algorithms (DGAs) can still allow adversaries to evade detection based on static domain lists.

4. Network/Host Artifacts

This category includes specific elements that might be left on a host or network, such as unique malware file paths, registry changes, or persistent configurations. These artifacts can provide more reliable indicators of compromise (IoCs) because they require more effort for an adversary to modify extensively across different attacks.

5. Tools

The tools that attackers use (e.g., software kits, exploit tools) are harder to replace or alter without significant cost or effort. Detecting and blocking specific tools can disrupt an attacker’s operations more substantially, as it forces them to develop or acquire new capabilities.

6. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs)

TTPs are the behaviors and methods used by attackers in their operations. Understanding and identifying TTPs are highly effective for defense because they are harder for adversaries to change. This level correlates with frameworks like the MITRE ATT&CK, which documents common TTPs used by threat actors.

7. Adversary Intent/Goals

At the top of the pyramid, understanding the adversaries' overarching goals or strategic intents is the most painful for them to mitigate against. If defenders can anticipate and counter the objectives of an attack, they can implement strategic defenses that preemptively disrupt attackers' plans.

The Pyramid of Pain highlights that while basic indicators like hashes and IP addresses are useful, they often result in lower-impact defenses. As defenders move up the pyramid, the indicators become more challenging for attackers to adjust, leading to more effective and enduring security measures.

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